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In late 201 1 , the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) released the second document in the series of
Presidential Policy  Directiv e 8: National Preparedness
(PPD-8) guidance. Although the initial release of the
National Preparedness Goal re-emphasized the use of a
capabilities-based approach to preparedness, the National
Preparedness Sy stem (NPS) description identified the
process by  which the nation should build and sustain its
emergency  management and homeland security
capabilities, organized in accordance with the fiv e mission
areas spelled out by  PPD-8: prev ention, protection, mitigation, response, and
recov ery . The NPS builds on sev eral y ears of capabilities-based preparedness by
updating the 2007  National Preparedness Guidelines with a process that
matches the National Preparedness Goal’s Core Capabilities.
At a surprisingly  concise six pages, the “NPS Description” actually  prov ides
v ery  little in the way  of concrete and actionable steps, rely ing on
supplementary  guidance – in the form of Comprehensiv e Preparedness Guides
and the Homeland Security  Exercise and Ev aluation Program – to prov ide the
granular details on how to transform concept into practice. The NPS also
incorporates the new DHS grant performance requirements of completing: (a) a
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA); (b) a State
Preparedness Report; and (c) the forthcoming Capability  Estimation Process.
Hav ing concluded the first required THIRA, which set the scope for the data
collection and analy sis needed for the State Preparedness Report, the states and
major metropolitan areas in the Urban Area Security  Initiativ e (UASI)
program met the FY 201 2 DHS grant performance requirements – mostly  by
trial and error, though, because they  had no “best practices” to draw upon.
Nonetheless, the FY 201 3  DHS grant guidance will place ev en greater emphasis
on the NPS as a driv ing mechanism for preparedness inv estment – mostly  by
incorporating capability  estimation as the analy sis tool between the THIRA’s
capability  preparedness targets and the capability  preparedness scoring of the
State Preparedness Report. For the third straight y ear, state and major urban
areas will hav e to further enhance their ability  to implement the NPS in order
to remain in compliance with DHS grants.
NPS implementation can usually  be broken down into two major categories:
organization and process. States and major urban areas with existing
preparedness programs – usually  based on legacy  national preparedness
programs or “homegrown” programs – may  well be challenged with adapting
their programs to meet the new requirements. Following are some of the more
important aspects of the two categories mentioned abov e.
Organization: An Emphasis on Core Capabilities
One of the most important components of emergency  preparedness is the people
directly  inv olv ed. State and local gov ernments implementing the NPS,
therefore, will probably  run into an organizational challenge when crafting
their NPS implementation strategies. Interagency  emergency  preparedness
programs at the state and local lev els rely  heav ily  on functional groupings,
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primarily  based on the emergency  support function structure of the National
Response Framework. In the almost 1 2  y ears that hav e passed since the 9/1 1
terrorist attacks, the emergency  support function structure has been an
essential component of most state and local emergency  management agencies.
Howev er, this institutionalized coordinating structure does not mesh well with
the organization of the National Preparedness Goal’s Core Capabilities.
The NPS’s emphasis on capabilities organized by  mission area is not an exact
replication of the emergency  support function construct, a bothersome reality
that leav es at least some emergency  managers confused about how to reconcile
the differences. Adding to this challenge is the fact that the functional
groupings within the National Disaster Recov ery  Framework – i.e., the
recov ery  support functions – represent a departure from the emergency
support function construct. Howev er, it appears that the recov ery  core
capabilities were dev eloped with the pre-existing National Disaster Recov ery
Framework in mind.
To complicate matters ev en further, PPD-8 places responsibility  on an
organization to be the ov erall lead in coordinating each mission area’s
capabilities set. The primary  choice for the traditional emergency
management mission areas of mitigation, response, and recov ery  is the
emergency  management agencies, but it is not y et clear who or what agency
should take ownership of the prev ention and protection missions. Ultimately ,
agency  authorities will hav e to dictate both the lead and the support roles, but
sev eral hard decisions will first hav e to be made.
The State Preparedness Report suggests that a tiered approach to data collection
– emphasizing the use of intrastate emergency  management or homeland
security  regions – might be the best alternativ e av ailable. By  using a regional
approach, which recognizes the reliance on mutual aid and assistance in
emergency  operations, local jurisdictions would, in theory , report capability
preparedness information to their regional working group(s); the latter would
in turn report up the line to the state emergency  management agency .
Unfortunately , this primarily  geographic v iew of emergency  preparedness
becomes somewhat problematic when integrating statewide agencies and
partners such as nonprofit organizations, as well as state agencies with local
offices that support local emergency  operations. Thoughtful consideration must
be giv en to the role of intergov ernmental coordination if an emergency
preparedness program is to be successful.
Process: Six or More Steps – And Lower Barriers
The first step in implementing the NPS process for states and major urban areas
is to thoroughly  consider the six steps and determine whether: (a) v arious
elements hav e to be added or subtracted; and/or (b) if the six steps should be
further div ided in order to make the sy stem actionable to the extent needed to
meet the challenges of a particular jurisdiction. Many  of the steps that
encompass the NPS would hav e to cov er sev eral programs when implemented –
a requirement that could be cumbersome in itself and also could cause
confusion related to program administration and ov ersight.
Although it is important that a “customized” implementation of the NPS not
require too many  steps, the goal should be to dev ise a sy stem that would
actually  reduce barriers to participation by , among other things, increasing
the specificity  of tasks and spelling out the accountability  for each. After a
customized implementation has been dev eloped, there are sev eral other
challenges that must be addressed to fully  realize how v arious capabilities will
be built, deliv ered, and ev aluated. Following is a brief analy sis of the most
important of those challenges.
Risk assessment challenges – The first requirement in this area is to determine
the definition of “risk” that the jurisdiction will use to fully  identify  threats and
hazards and, by  doing so, assess the risk posed by  each. The THIRA and the
hazard mitigation planning related to hazard identification and risk assessment
are among the more important tools to use in this step, but each jurisdiction
must ultimately  decide how it wants to ev aluate the risk to the community
posed by  each threat or hazard considered.
The threat and hazard identification process driv es the formulation of specific
preparedness targets, as well as preparedness goals, that v arious jurisdictions
must dev elop. The preparedness target identifies what the jurisdiction needs to
fully  deliv er a specific capability . Capability  targets must be based in turn on
the understanding, on the part of jurisdiction leaders, of what they  are
preparing for, which would be either: (a) the realistic consequences of the
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threats and hazards they  face; or (b) the most likely  impacts of a catastrophic
occurrence. For UASI states, harmonizing the THIRA is critical to ensuring
consistency  between capability  targets at both the state and UASI lev els.
Capability estimation challenges – Capability  estimation inv olv es: (a)
determining the plans, organization, equipment, training, and exercise
elements required to build and sustain a specific capability ; and (b) comparing
those requirements to the actual resources and activ ities av ailable to
determine any  gap that remains. When conducting a capability  assessment, it
is important to interface not only  with neighboring jurisdictions but also with
state and regional partners. Such collaboration could result in capability
estimates that consistently  measure capability  requirements and allow for
information sharing, particularly  information related to implementation of the
National Incident Management Sy stem. Effectiv e state-to-local jurisdiction
coordination and communication also ensures that resources are not double
counted as both a local and a state asset. The potential to ov erestimate
resources through double counting is particularly  high in areas where state
agencies hav e local offices that support local emergency  operations.
Capability validation challenges – For capability  v alidation, it is important that
a consistent policy  be used to determine when it is appropriate for after-action
reporting. It is unrealistic to require a formal after-action process each and
ev ery  time a capability  is deliv ered. For example, coping with a multi-v ehicle
collision inv olv ing the potential spill of hazardous materials requires sev eral
core capabilities – critical transportation, env ironmental response/health and
safety , on-scene security  and protection, and public health and medical
serv ices. Such incidents are relativ ely  common in some jurisdictions. To
require an after-action report for all such situations in those jurisdictions,
though, could be unduly  cumbersome and might ultimately  result in
unnecessary  paperwork and capability  v alidation data. Among the potential
thresholds that should be considered in such cases are the following: (a) The
number of capabilities deliv ered; (b) any  remaining challenges identified that
require improv ement; (c) significant improv ements in the deliv ery  of the
v arious capabilities needed; and (d) the number of agencies inv olv ed in the
deliv ery  of those capabilities.
The Scarcity of Best Practices & Other Pitfalls
One continuing challenge that state and local jurisdictions must face as they
mov e forward with implementing PPD-8 is the limited number of existing best
practices that hav e already  been v alidated. Each jurisdiction will, therefore,
either hav e to dev elop a preparedness sy stem process from the ground up or
wait for other jurisdictions to dev elop best practices that can be adapted to fit
the needs of other locales.
Nonetheless, political and operational jurisdictions must conduct their own
thorough and sy stematic capability  estimates and dev elop the processes needed
to build, maintain, and ev aluate the v arious capabilities required. Any
jurisdictions that will not or cannot do this will lack the accurate and consistent
data on resource gaps that they  will need to make their own future resource
procurement and allocation decisions. Beginning the process by  giv ing full and
objectiv e consideration of the potential pitfalls identified abov e can help ease
the ov erall sy stem dev elopment decisions required.
For most states and major urban areas, implementation of the NPS has become
a necessity  for many  reasons, but particularly  to continue receiv ing DHS grant
funding. It also is important, though, that the DHS itself recognize the
challenges that lower-lev el jurisdictions will face in meeting the National
Preparedness Goal, specifically  including giv ing thoughtful consideration to the
quantity  and v ariety  of resources required to sometimes totally  transform
legacy  preparedness programs that are no longer v alid or effectiv e.
________________________
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